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Running head: VISUAL TIMING OF THE LANDING FLARE

Effects of Scenery, Lighting, Glideslope and
Experience on Timing the Landing Flare
Stephen Palmisano, Simone Favelle, and W.L. Sachtler
University of Wollongong
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Abstract
This study examined 3 visual strategies for timing the initiation of the landing flare based
on perceptions of either: (i) a critical height above ground level; (ii) a critical runway
width angle (Ψ); or (iii) a critical time-to-contact (TTC) with the runway. Visual displays
simulated landing approaches with trial-to-trial variations in glideslope, lighting, and
scene detail. Twenty-four participants (8 private pilots, 8 student pilots and 8 non-pilots)
were instructed to initiate the flare when they perceived that their TTC with the runway
(30 m wide by 840 m long) had reached a critical value of 2 seconds. Our results
demonstrated a significant effect of flight experience on flare timing accuracy and
dominance of the height-based strategy over the runway-width-angle and TTC-based
strategies.
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Effects of Scenery, Lighting, Glideslope and
Experience on Timing the Landing Flare
To obtain a safe, smooth landing, pilots of fixed-wing aircraft must reduce their
descent rate during the final stages of the landing approach (Grosz et al., 1995; Mulder,
Pleijsant, van der Vaart, & van Wieringen, 2000). This is achieved by performing the
landing flare manoeuvre. While the flare is often regarded as a continuous manoeuvre, it
actually has two distinct phases: flare initiation (or ‘leveloff’) followed by ‘roundout’
(Benbassat, Willams & Abramson, 2005). Below we describe the situation facing a pilot
landing a general aviation aircraft (e.g., a Cessna 152). First, it is essential that the pilot
make a well-timed decision to initiate the flare. During this initial leveloff phase, the
pilot typically sets the throttle to idle and simultaneously transitions the aircraft from a
nose-down approach attitude to straight and level flight (by pulling backwards on the
yoke or control wheel). Then during the roundout phase, the pilot continues to adjust the
aircraft so as to reach the desired (nose-high) landing attitude and descent rate at
touchdown (Benbassat et al., 2005; Langewiesche, 1972). If performed correctly, the
flare manoeuvre should reduce the aircraft’s descent rate to acceptable levels {e.g., from
around 3 m/s (591 ft/min) during the glide to 1 m/s (197 ft/min) or less on touchdown –
Grosz et al., 1995} so that it settles gently on the main landing gear.
The landing flare is considered one of the most technically demanding aspects of
piloting. Both novice and expert pilots consistently rate the landing flare as one of the
most difficult flight manoeuvres (Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b). It has been
conservatively estimated that 18% of all landing accidents in the USA between 1995 and
2000 were due to problems with the landing flare (Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b;
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Benbassat et al., 2005). In one questionnare study by Benbassat and Abramson (2002b),
87% of the 134 US pilots sampled indicated that they used visual cues to time the
initiation of the flare. However, no consensus emerged as to which specific visual cues
were required for a successful flare. A more recent study by Benbassat et al. (2005)
examined the landing flare in finer detail. They had novice, intermediate and expert
pilots rate the perceived difficulty of the leveloff and roundout phases of the flare.
Suprisingly, many of the pilots were unclear as to the distinction between these two
phases (including the experts). When definitions were provided, their participants were
found to rate both leveloff (“determining the aircraft height and beginning of the flare”
pp. 193) and roundout (“increasing the angle of attack by raising the nose of the aircraft
after the leveloff” pp. 193) as equally difficult.
The goal of the present study was to examine the visual cues that pilots could use to
accurately time the initiation of the landing flare (i.e., leveloff). Accurate timing of the
leveloff phase is crucial. If flare initiation is too late, then the aircraft will eventually
make hard contact with the runway. If it is too early, then the aircraft may level out at too
high an altitude, which is also problematic because: (i) it increases the likelihood of long
landings and runway overruns; and (ii) any further reduction in airspeed may cause the
aircraft to stall and drop with excessive velocity (Grosz et al., 1995). While leveloff
timing errors can be compensated for (to a degree) during roundout, it is clear from selfreports and questionnaire studies that accurate flare timing is an essential skill for pilots
to acquire and retain.
Three possible visual strategies for timing the initiation of the landing flare have been
identified in the literature. First, pilots could initiate the landing flare when they perceive
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that they are at a critical height above ground level (AGL). The critical height AGL for
the flare depends on several factors. For example, the critical flare height might be 3 to 9
m (10 to 20 ft) AGL for a small or light (i.e., general aviation) aircraft compared to 24 m
(80 ft) AGL for a larger transport aircraft (Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b; Benbassat et
al., 2005; Langewiesche, 1972). In principle, the pilot’s perception of height in this
situation could be based on a variety of visual cues including stereopsis (binocular
disparity), size (familiar and relative size), horizon (height in the visual field), motion
(motion parallax and optic flow), texture gradients (linear perspective and compression
gradients), etc (Allison, Gillam & Vecellio, 2007; Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b;
Benbassat, Abramson, & Williams, 2002; Cutting & Vishton, 1995; Langewiesche, 1972;
Riordan, 1974). Importantly, scene depths, heights and ground slant are often
misperceived in entry-level flight simulators (which utilise binocular viewing of 3-D
displays on near 2-D screens without collimation - Pierce & Geri, 1998; Roscoe, 1979).
Thus, if accurate flare timing requires veridical perceptions of scene layout (including
height AGL), then systematic errors might occur when using such simulators.
As a second strategy, pilots could initiate the landing flare when the visual angle (Ψ)
formed between the left and right edges of the runway at the aiming line reaches a critical
value (see Figure 1). The aiming line is a hypothetical line that lies at right angles to the
runway alignment and passes through the pilot’s aimpoint (Mulder et al., 2000). Because
this strategy is based only on a visual angle, it should allow accurate flare timing
performance even when scene depths, heights and slants are misperceived (e.g., during
night landings or when using entry-level simulators). However, this strategy should
produce serious errors (at least initially) when applied to unfamiliar runways (e.g., if one

Effects of Scenery 6
used a critical Ψ angle value appropriate for a familiar, narrow runway, this would
produce an early flare when landing on an unfamiliar wide runway; see Mertens, 1981;
Mertens & Lewis, 1982).
Finally, pilots could initiate the landing flare when their perceived time-to-contact
(TTC) with the runway reaches a critical value (Grosz et al., 1995; Lee, 1980; Mulder et
al., 2000). TTC during landing is defined as “the time remaining to the moment that the
wheels make contact with the runway if no pilot action is taken” (Mulder et al., 2000, p.
294). However, since the aircraft’s wheels are not visible, TTC is probably perceived by
the pilot as the time remaining for him/her to make contact with the runway. This TTC
could be perceived indirectly (e.g., McLeod & Ross, 1983), either by dividing the pilot’s
perceived distance to the aimpoint by the perceived approach velocity, or by dividing the
pilot’s perceived height above ground by his/her perceived descent rate. However, since
human perceptions of absolute distance and absolute velocity can be highly error prone
(e.g., Schiff, Oldak, & Shah, 1992; Scialfa, Guzy, Leibowitz & Garvey, 1991; Sidaway,
Fairweather, Sekiya & McNitt-Gray, 1996), some theorists have argued that TTC must be
perceived directly (i.e., without first estimating speed and distance). One possibility is
that TTC is calculated directly via the following ratio (known as optic tau – see Lee,
1976; 1980):
Tau ≈ θ/(dθ/dt)

[1]

One commonly studied TTC scenario is the perpendicular approach, where the
observer moves along a straight line towards a frontoparallel surface, which in turn
generates a global pattern of optic flow. In such situations, the optical expansion is
isotropic (see Figure 2A) and the θ term in this equation can be defined in several
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different ways, resulting in useful local and global tau-based information about TTC.
Consider the situation facing an automobile driver approaching a truck stopped at a set of
traffic lights. In the case of global tau, θ would be defined as the instantaneous visual
angle between the moving observer’s aimpoint (which coincides with the focus of
expansion of the global optic flow) and any other visible point lying on the truck (Lee,
1980; Tresilian, 1991). In the case of local tau type 1, θ would be defined as the
instantaneous angular distance between any two visible points on the rear of the truck
(e.g., its left and right brake lights - Tresilian, 1991); and (iii) in the case of local tau type
2, θ would be defined as the angular distance between the optical boundaries of the truck
(e.g., its left and right sides - Lee, 1976; Tresilian, 1991). In all three cases, dθ/dt refers
to the instantaneous rate of change in these angular distances over time.

In this

perpendicular approach situation, both local and global tau would provide accurate
estimates of TTC that could in principle be used to safely approach and stop behind the
truck1.
Importantly, Mulder et al. (2000) have argued that the local and global tau cues
described above, are not appropriate for estimating TTC during an aircraft landing.
These slanted landing approaches (along a straight line and towards a rectangular runway
lying on a horizontal ground plane) generate asymmetrical patterns of optical expansion
(see Figure 2B). In this specific case, Mulder et al. showed that the tau equation only
accurately specifies the TTC during landing when it is based on optical expansion which
occurs along the aiming line. From Figure 2B, we can see that TTC estimates based on
the optical expansion of points lying above the aiming line should result in TTC
underestimation (due to their slower rate of expansion), whereas TTC estimates based on
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optical expansion of points lying below the aiming line should lead to TTC
overestimation (due to their faster rate of expansion). Mulder et al. derived a ‘restricted’
tau cue specifically for this landing situation, which was identical to the global tau cue
described above, with one exception: it was based on the optical expansion between the
aimpoint and any other point lying on the aiming line. However, accurate estimates of
TTC could in principle be provided in this situation by the optical expansion between any
two points lying on the aiming line. This ‘restricted’ local tau type 1 cue could be based
on the expansion either between the two points where the aiming line intersects with the
left and right edges of the runway, or between two points lying on the aiming line outside
the runway boundaries, etc. Importantly, perceptions of TTC based on restricted global
or restricted local tau cues should improve when additional ground texture is provided
along the aiming line, as this would enable multiple estimates of TTC.
The available evidence for the use of the three flare timing strategies outlined above is
inconclusive. Consistent with the critical perceived height strategy for flare timing, flight
instructors and instruction manuals typically suggest that the flare should be initiated
when the pilot judges that the plane has reached the appropriate height above the runway
(e.g., Benbassat et al., 2005; Thom, 1994).

Interestingly, actual aircraft landings

performed under monocular viewing conditions have been found to be as accurate as
those performed under binocular viewing conditions (e.g., Grosslight, Fletcher, Masterton
& Hagen, 1978; Lewis & Krier, 1969; Lewis, Blakeley, Masters & McMurty, 1973).
Thus, if a perceived critical height strategy is involved in timing the flare, it appears that
monocularly available height information must be sufficient for the successful
execution/completion of this task (see also Benbassat & Abramson, 2002a).
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Grosz et al. (1995) found little support for any of the three above-mentioned strategies
in their flight simulator study, where three jet transport pilots actively controlled 126
simulated landings from a distance of 5 km from the runway to touchdown. Contrary to
their predictions, they found that pilots did not initiate their flares at either a constant
height above the runway, or a constant time before touchdown. They explained the
failure of the above theories to account for flare timing performance by proposing that the
experienced pilots in their study primarily “wanted to make contact with the runway at a
specific point” (Grosz et al., 1995, pp. 119). They suggested that future studies should
constrain the response task in order to test these different strategies in terms of more
relevant criteria (e.g., reducing the descent rate on touchdown to safe levels).
In more recent research, Mulder et al. (2000) found mixed support for the proposals
that flare timing is based on perceived runway width angle (Ψ) and perceived TTC based
on tau. In their simulation study, non-pilot (as opposed to pilot) participants viewed
schematic landing displays and simply pressed the space bar on the computer’s keyboard
when they perceived that they should initiate an idealised pre-programmed flare.
Interestingly, Mulder and his colleagues found that flare timing strategies appeared to
change from being based on perceived runway width angle when only a runway outline
was provided, to being based on perceived TTC when additional texture was provided
along the aiming line. This suggested that as the visual information about TTC became
more reliable, flare timing responses were predominantly based on the perceptions of
critical TTC.

The Experiment
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The current study was aimed at examining these three visual strategies, each of which
could in principle be used to accurately time the initiation of the landing flare. We hoped
to avoid some of the possible problems in the earlier Grosz et al. (1995) study, where the
participant’s extensive flight experience and the active nature of the glideslope control
task may have complicated the flare error data (which would have consisted of
components due to both initiation and control error).

Instead we chose to focus

exclusively on the initiation phase of the flare, which we examined using a passive flare
timing task combined with performance feedback. The actual TTC at the start of each
landing simulation varied from trial-to-trial. Participants were instructed to watch the
simulation and only initiate a landing flare when they perceived that their TTC with the
runway had reached 2 s (the critical TTC for all of the conditions tested in this
experiment). Unlike the Mulder et al. (2000) study, we tested not only non-pilots, but also
student pilots and private pilots. The aim of testing these three groups of participants was
to determine whether the different levels of flight experience had any influence on either
their choice of flare timing strategy or their response accuracy using our highly
constrained experimental task.
Prior to the experiment, participants in each of the three flight experience groups were
trained extensively to recognise the critical 2 s time interval. During the simulated
landing approaches in the subsequent experimental trials, they pressed a mouse button to
indicate that they perceived that the critical time had arrived to initiate the flare.
Participants were then told whether they had flared too early or too late and by how many
seconds, which should have allowed them to identify the critical TTC for this specific
landing scenario (Gagnon, Fleury, & Bard 1988; Tresilian, 1995).
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We examined flare timing performance: (i) for 3° and 6° glideslope approaches; (ii)
with both day and night lighting conditions; and (iii) with or without 3-D buildings
present.

While the actual TTC at the start of the trial depended on the simulated

glideslope, the critical TTC was always 2 s and the critical runway width angle was
always 23.5° for both of the glideslope conditions tested. However, the critical heights
AGL were different for the 3° (3.8 m) and 6° (7.5 m) glideslopes. Thus, if participants
used either a tau-based critical TTC or a critical runway width angle strategy, they should
show no glideslope effects on their flare timing. However, if they used either a non-tau
based critical TTC strategy or a critical perceived height strategy, their data should
display significant glideslope effects on flare timing - which might be more marked
during night lighting conditions without 3-D buildings, because less depth/distance
information would be available.

Our predictions in terms of the other display

manipulations (day versus night lighting and buildings versus no buildings) were as
follows. If participants were using a critical runway width angle strategy then we would
expect that their performance would not be significantly altered by either manipulation,
since the runway outline on which it was based was always visible. Conversely, if
accurate perception of the scene layout (including height AGL) was important, then
displays which have day lighting and contain 3-D buildings should produce more
accurate and consistent flare performance. However, according to Mulder et al. (2000),
similar effects might also be found if participants used a critical TTC strategy, because
adding day lighting and 3-D buildings would increase the amount of texture along the
aiming line, and would therefore provide more visual information for TTC (based on
restricted tau).
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Method

Participants
Twenty-four males were paid for their participation in this study. Sixteen of these
participants had flight experience and were recruited from NSWAir and the Australian
Aerial Patrol Flight School located at Albion Park, New South Wales. There were eight
student pilots, who had a mean age of 25.6 years (with a standard deviation of 6.9 years)
and had accrued 23 flight hours on average (SD = 17.8). There were also eight private
pilots with mean age of 38.4 years (with a standard deviation of 11.7 years) who had
accrued 217 flight hours on average (SD = 63.8). The remaining eight participants were
non-pilots - psychology graduate/undergraduate students at the University of Wollongong
(mean age 24.8 years with a standard deviation of 6.5 years). All of the non-pilots,
student pilots and private pilots in our study had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.

Materials & Apparatus
Displays were generated by a Macintosh G5 personal computer and presented on a
Samsung Trinitron SyncMaster monitor (37 cm wide x 27.5 cm high, with a pixel
resolution of 1280 x 1024 and an 85 Hz refresh rate). A chin rest was used to align the
participant’s eye level with the simulated location of the display’s true (implicit) horizon
– this chin rest was located 45 cm in front of the 44.7° wide x 34.0° high display. A
follow-up questionnaire was given to student and private pilots to examine their
perceptions of the landing flare – the items of which were taken from an earlier survey
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study by Benbassat and Abramson (2002b). In this questionnaire, pilot participants rated
the perceived difficulty of the landing flare compared to nine other standard flight
manoeuvres (“steep turns”, “takeoff roll”, “holding altitude”, “climbing”, “descending”,
“taxiing”, “coordinated turns”, “forward slip” and “landing roll”). They were also asked
whether they relied on visual or other information (“instrument readings”, “gut reaction”,
“sense of balance”, “other”) to initiate the landing flare. If participants responded that
they used “vision” to initiate the flare, they were asked to indicate which of the following
was the most important cue or information for flare timing (“shape of the runway”
“runway markings”, “angle with the runway”, “horizon”, “familiar objects”, “motion
parallax”, “descent rate”, or “other” cues). Finally, they were also asked to indicate the
factors that they felt were responsible for their current successful landing flares (“pattern
practice”, “natural ability”, “sheer luck”, “aviation books”, “my instructor”, “other”).

Visual displays
Computer-generated displays simulated fixed-wing aircraft landing approaches under
day or night lighting conditions (approach velocity was held constant in all cases at 130
km/hr or 70 KIAS). Each approach simulated either a 3º or 6º glideslope (producing a
descent rate of either 1.9 m/s = 374 ft/min or 3.8 m/s = 748 ft/min), starting 30 m AGL
and then progressing towards the rectangular red aimpoint marker lying on the runway.
On 3° approaches the actual TTC with this aimpoint marker was 15.87 s at the start of the
trial, whereas on 6° approaches the actual TTC at the start of the trial was 7.96 s. The
location of this aimpoint marker varied randomly from trial-to-trial, ranging 100 m to 250
m from the start of the runway (starting distance was adjusted accordingly). The runway
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was 30 m (or 100 ft) wide by 840 m (or 2755 ft) long, and was lined by 15 white lights
placed in intervals of 60 m along each of the two long runway edges. Unlike other scene
features in the display, there was no local change in the image size of either the runway
lights or the red aimpoint marker during the simulated approach. Both the aimpoint and
the runway rested on a 1000 m (or 3281 ft) wide by 2000 m (or 6562 ft) deep flat ground
plane. In half of the trials in this experiment, five buildings were placed in random
locations on the left of the runway and five buildings were placed in random locations on
the right of the runway (see Figure 3B). Buildings ranged in height from 1 to 10 storeys
(3 to 30 m. Typical aircraft hangars are approximately 6 m high), and in width from 24 to
48 m. During night lighting conditions, only the red aimpoint marker, the white runway
lights and the 3-D texture-mapped buildings (when present) were visible. During day
lighting conditions, the detailed textures of the runway tarmac and the surrounding
ground plane surface were also visible (see Figure 3A). In these day lighting conditions,
the most distant parts of the ground plane were obscured by a simulated fog – the goal
being to reduce the strength of the false visible horizon produced by the ground’s finite
dimensions. Specifically, at the beginning of the display this was located 0.86º below the
true horizon and moved up the participant’s visual field as the viewpoint changed during
the simulated descent.

Procedure
Each participant went through three training phases prior to the main experiment. In
the first training phase, participants were shown demonstration programs simulating an
idealised preprogrammed flare, which was automatically initiated when the TTC with the
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ground (based on the constant velocity glide at 130 km/hr) reached 2 s. Thus, for a 3°
approach the flare was initiated 13.87 s after display onset, whereas for a 6° approach the
flare was initiated 5.96 s after display onset. After the flare had been initiated, the
manoeuvre itself had an exponential trajectory and lasted 6 s (for the flare equation - see
Mulder et al., 2000, pp. 303). During each demonstration, participants were shown a
real-time readout of both the simulated TTC and the simulated height AGL. In the second
training phase, participants were simply required to time a 2 s interval. No landing
display was presented. Only the following instructions were displayed on the monitor:
“Press the space bar then the mouse button 2 s later”. After each 2 s time interval was
produced, written feedback was displayed on the monitor indicating the accuracy of the
participants estimate (“too early” or “too late by … seconds”).

Participants had to

produce this 2 s time interval a minimum of 10 times. In order to proceed onto the next
training phase, participants had to produce an estimation error smaller than 0.5 seconds
on 5 consecutive training trials. In the third and final training phase, participants were
exposed to both the computer generated landing displays and the flare timing task used in
the main experiment. Each participant ran one full block of 40 practice trials. The details
of this final training phase and the main experiment are described below.
In the main experiment, displays were blocked by scene type: 2 blocks used displays
which contained no 3-D buildings (only the runway and the ground plane, the latter was
visible only in day lighting conditions – see Figure 3A), whereas the remaining 2 blocks
used displays which each contained ten visible 3-D buildings. Each of these blocks
consisted of 40 trials simulating both 3º and 6º approaches during either night and day
lighting conditions. Four participants in each group (non-pilot, student pilot or private
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pilot) were randomly allocated to practice trial displays with 3-D buildings and 4 were
randomly allocated to practice trial displays without 3-D buildings. They were instructed
that they always need to initiate the flare when they perceived that they were 2 s from
touchdown. Participants started a trial by pressing the spacebar on the keyboard and then
later initiated the flare by pressing the mouse button. In order to produce 0 s timing error,
participants needed to initiate their flares when the TTC with the aimpoint was 2 s, which
corresponded to a critical runway width angle (Ψ) of 23.5° or a critical distance to the
aimpoint of 72 m (regardless of the angle of the linear approach).

However, if

participants were using a critical height strategy, they needed to initiate their flare when
they were at a height of 3.8 m AGL during 3° approaches or 7.5 m AGL during 6°
approaches (as the descent rate was higher in the latter condition). The display froze after
each flare initiation and participants were immediately provided with written feedback on
the display monitor about their flare initiation performance (“too early” or “too late by …
seconds” – see Figure 1). After completing 40 practice trials, participants then ran the 4
experimental blocks (all with performance feedback) in a random order. There were 20
replications of each scene by lighting by glideslope condition combination per
participant. The experimental software was written so that data were only recorded for
trials for which the frame rate remained above 60 Hz (“bad trials” were automatically
retested later in the experiment). On completion of the main experiment, participants
performed 10 more runs on the Two second time interval estimation task without
performance feedback. The goal of this retest was to check whether there were group
differences in the ability to time a 2 s interval (as opposed to a 2 s TTC). When this task
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was completed, the non-pilot participants were dismissed from the study. Student and
private pilots were however still required to complete the landing flare questionnaire.

Results
Landing Flare Questionnaire Data
The results of our survey on 16 Australian aviators were found to closely replicate
those of the Benbassat and Abramson (2002b) study, carried out on a much larger sample
of 134 US aviators. Consistent with the earlier study: (i) all but one of our 16 pilot
participants rated the landing flare as the most difficult of the 10 standard flight
manoeuvres (compared to steep turns, takeoff roll, holding altitude, climbing, descending,
taxiing, coordinated turns, forward slip and the landing roll) and indicated that practice
was the major contributing factor to recent successful flares; and (ii) all 16 pilot
participants indicated that they used vision to initiate the landing flare (two of the private
pilots and 2 student pilots chose gut reaction when given the opportunity to choose a
second option). Consistent again with the findings of the Benbassat and Abramson
(2002b) study, little consensus emerged as to which specific visual cues were reported to
be necessary for a successful landing. When given the opportunity to choose more than
one item, multiple items were chosen by all of our pilot participants (see Figure 4). For
example, some chose runway based cues: “angle with the runway”, “end of the runway”,
and “shape of the runway”, “runway markings”. Others chose traditional monocular
distance cues, such as “motion parallax”, “relative size”, “texture gradient”, “familiar
size”, and “horizon” (note that “shape of the runway” is also a monocular distance cue).
Possibly due to the priming inherent in the experimental instructions and training, one of
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the student pilots included “time-to-contact” under the “other” option. Table 1 clearly
illustrates the similarity of the current visual cue ratings to those of the Benbassat and
Abramson (2002b) study, which in turn suggests that these visual cues are given similar
emphasis during US and Australian flight training. However, these survey results should
still be interpreted with some caution since pilots might not be conscious or aware of the
visual cues that they actually use to time the flare, and even if they are, they might still
have difficulty expressing (or verbalizing) how this task is carried out.

Two-second Time Interval Estimation Error Data
Before running the analyses on the data obtained in the experimental conditions, we
checked for any group (non-pilot, student pilot and private pilot) differences in estimating
a 2 s time interval (as opposed to a 2 s TTC). We performed a Between-groups ANOVA
on this 2 s time interval estimation data. The main effect of group type failed to reach
significance (F 2,21 = 1.01, p > .05, Cohen’s ƒ = 0.31), indicating that non-pilots, student
pilots, and private pilots produced similar errors when attempting to estimate a 2 s time
interval.

Flare Timing Error Data
A split-plot ANOVA was then performed on the mean flare timing error data. Group
type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) was again the between subjects factor and
there were three within subjects factors: scenery type (buildings or no buildings),
glideslope type (3º or 6º), and lighting type (day or night). The results and statistics are
shown in Table 2. We found a significant main effect of glideslope on flare timing errors.
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As can be seen in Figure 5, participants tended to initiate the flare too early (i.e., before 2
s TTC) for 3º glideslope conditions and too late (i.e., after 2 s TTC) for 6º glideslope
conditions. While we did not find a significant main effect of group type, we did find a
significant interaction between group type and glideslope. From Figure 5, it can also be
seen that all 3 types of participant (non-pilots, student pilots and private pilots) displayed
the same tendencies to flare too early on 3º approaches and too late on 6° approaches.
However, these biases were markedly larger for the non-pilots compared to the student
and private pilots.
We also found a significant main effect of scene type on flare timing errors, indicating
that visual displays which contained 3-D buildings produced less flare timing error than
those without buildings (see Figure 6). While the main effect of lighting did not reach
significance, we did find a significant interaction between scene type and lighting type.
We interpreted this finding as indicating that the presence of 3-D buildings in the display
reduced flare timing error more during simulated night lighting conditions than during
simulated day lighting conditions (see Figure 6). No other main effects or interactions
reached significance.

Runway Width Angle (Ψ) at Flare
A 3 (Group type) x 2 (Scene type) x 2 (Lighting type) x 2 (Glideslope type) split-plot
ANOVA was also performed on the mean runway width angle Ψ at flare data. The results
and statistics are shown in Table 3. We found a significant main effect of glideslope on
the runway width angle at flare. While the critical runway width angle was 23.5º for both
of the glideslope conditions tested, participants were found to initiate the flare at smaller
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Ψ angles for 3º approaches (21.4º ± 9.5º) and larger Ψ angles for 6º approaches (27.5º ±
9.6º). While the main effect of group type on runway width angle at flare was not
significant, the interaction between group type and glideslope was significant.

From

Figure 7 we can see that the biasing effect of glideslope on the runway width angle at
flare was greater for the non-pilots than for the student or private pilots.
Interestingly, we also found a significant main effect of lighting on runway width
angle at flare, which was not evident in the flare timing data. Specifically, the mean Ψ
angle at flare was 22.91° ± 6.75° during day simulations compared to 26.01° ± 12.29°
during night simulations. This demonstrates that the actual Ψ angle chosen at flare was
closer to the ideal Ψ angle at flare (of 23.5°) during day lighting conditions. Unlike the
flare timing error data, neither the main effect of scene type, nor the interaction between
scene type and lighting type reached significance for the runway width angle data.
However, it should be noted that while TTC at flare and runway width angle at flare were
highly related in this experiment, their relationship was non-linear, which could account
for the observed differences between these two data sets.

No other main effects or

interactions reached significance.

Height AGL at flare
A 3 (Group) x 2 (Scene type) x 2 (Lighting type) x 2 (Glideslope type) split-plot
ANOVA was also performed on the mean height AGL at flare data. The results and
statistics are shown in Table 4. We found a significant main effect of glideslope type on
the height AGL at flare. As can be seen from Figure 8, non-pilots, student pilots and
private pilots correctly initiated their flares at lower heights AGL for 3º glideslopes (M =
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4.76 m; S.D. = 2.08 m) and at higher heights AGL for 6° glideslope conditions (M = 6.96
m; S.D. = 1.96 m). While we did not find a significant main effect of group type, we did
find a significant interaction between group type and glideslope. From Figure 8, it can
also be seen that the flare heights selected by student pilots (4.2 ± 1.1 m for 3°
glideslopes; 7.1 ± 1.8 m for 6° glideslopes) and private pilots (4.6 ± 1.7 m for 3°; 7.3 ±
1.9 m for 6°) were much closer to the actual critical heights for our ideal flares (3.8 m for
3°; 7.5 m for 6°) than those selected by the non-pilots (5.3 ± 2.8 m for 3°; 6.4 ± 2.1 m for
6°).
While the main effects of lighting type and scene type did not reach significance, we
did find a significant interaction between scene type and lighting. The presence of 3-D
buildings in the display was found to reduce the height AGL at flare more for night
simulations than for day simulations. This general reduction in flare heights improved
task performance in 3° glideslope conditions (as flare heights without buildings tended to
be greater than the critical value of 3.8 m), but not for 6° glideslope conditions (as flare
heights without buildings tended to be less than the critical value of 7.5 m). No other
main effects or interactions reached significance.

Discussion
Our study examined three different visual strategies that could be used to time the
initiation of the landing flare, based on either a perceived critical TTC with the runway, a
perceived critical runway width angle, or a perceived critical height AGL. Exclusive use
of the critical runway width angle strategy should have led to accurate performance in all
conditions tested, since the runway outline was always available. However, contrary to
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this prediction, we found that the display lighting and building manipulations
significantly influenced flare timing performance. Flare timing accuracy was found to
improve when landing simulations contained 3-D buildings. However, the effects that
these buildings had on performance depended on the display lighting: adding 3-D
buildings to night lighting displays had a greater effect on flare timing performance than
adding 3-D buildings to day lighting conditions. While these scene effects were generally
consistent with the tau-based TTC strategy, where according to Mulder et al. (2000)
performance should improve when ground texture is added along the aiming line, they
were also consistent with the use of a perceived height/distance strategy. Importantly, the
runway width angle and tau-based TTC strategies both predicted that glideslope
manipulations in the current experiment should have little effect on flare timing
judgments because both the critical TTC (2 s) and the critical runway width angle (23.5°)
were identical for the two glideslope conditions tested (3° and 6°). Contrary to these
predictions, all of our participants were found to flare too early during simulated 3°
approaches and too late during simulated 6° approaches. Since only the critical height
AGL was altered by the simulated glideslope in this experiment (critical values were 3.8
m for 3° approaches and 7.5 m for 6° approaches), the observed glideslope biases
suggested that perception/misperception of height AGL influenced task performance.
That is, the results were most consistent with participants using a flare timing strategy
based on either a critical perceived height or on an indirectly (i.e., not tau based)
perceived critical TTC (e.g., the latter could be calculated by dividing the perceived
height AGL by the perceived descent rate).
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While all 3 types of participant flared too early/high during simulated 3° approaches
and too late/low during simulated 6° approaches, these biases were significantly smaller
for student and private pilots than for the non-pilots. One possible explanation for this
finding might be that the non-pilots were simply less motivated to perform well than our
student pilots and private pilots. Contrary to this notion, all three groups of participants
were found to perform with similar levels of accuracy in the simple 2 s time interval
estimation control task. However, the flare timing task was more challenging than this
time interval estimation task, potentially involving multiple perceptions (of runway width
angle, height AGL, as well as TTC) and requiring the selection and calibration of
successful strategies. Also, unlike our non-pilot participants, the pilots would have been
aware of the serious consequences of incorrectly timing the landing flare. Thus, it is
possible that differences in motivation might have been more evident with the flare
timing task.
A far more likely (and interesting) explanation for the pilot performance advantage
was that these results reflected the group differences in flight experience. As we noted in
the introduction, our student and private pilot participants should have been primed to use
a perceived critical height strategy due to their flight training and real world flight
experience (where, unlike the situation in our simulation experiments, they would have
typically been exposed to a full complement of depth/distance cues upon landing). Thus,
they should have been able to quickly identify and calibrate this successful flare timing
strategy and then use it exclusively from that point onwards. Consistent with this notion,
in an earlier flight simulation experiment, Grosz et al. (1995) found evidence that their
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highly trained commercial pilot participants were heavily biased towards initiating the
flare at a particular height.
Our non-pilots appeared to have much more difficulty identifying a successful flare
timing strategy. We found that the flare heights chosen by non-pilots during 3° (5.32 ±
2.87 m) and 6° approaches (6.46 ± 2.05 m) were actually closer to the mean of two the
critical flare heights (i.e., 5.65 m) than to their respective critical values (of 3.8 m and 7.5
m). That is, their flare initiation performance demonstrated a strong a central tendency
bias (e.g., Slack, 1953). This non-pilot performance contrasted markedly with the student
and private pilot performance, where the flare heights chosen during 3° (4.29 ± 1.15 m;
4.67 ± 1.69 m) and 6° approaches (7.09 ± 1.87 m; 7.34 ± 1.85 m) were much closer to
their respective critical flare heights than to the mean of these two values. Thus, it
appears that the non-pilots were significantly more likely to develop a flawed flare timing
strategy in which they initiated their flares at approximately the same height AGL for
both glideslope conditions.
Research has shown that observers tend to respond earlier in TTC and collision control
tasks when the speed of closure is slower (e.g., McLeod & Ross, 1983; Schiff, et al.,
1992; Smith, Flach, Dittman & Stanard, 2001). Because both the starting height AGL
(30m) and the approach velocity (130 km/hr) were held constant in the current
experiment, the descent rate (or the vertical speed of closure with the ground) varied
significantly with the glideslope (1.9 m/s for 3° approaches and 3.8 m/s for 6°
approaches). This glideslope-based difference in descent rate could potentially explain
the finding that non-pilots flared much earlier than they should have in 3° conditions (by
on average 0.8 s compared to 0.4 s for pilots) and later than they should have in 6°
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conditions (by on average 0.3 s compared to 0.1 s for pilots). If one ignored the presence
of the two different approach angles (which participants were informed both had a critical
TTC of 2 s), such a central tendency bias would have actually been reinforced by the
performance feedback (“too early” or “too late”) provided across different trials.
Why then did the perceived critical height strategy dominate pilot flare timing
responses in the current experiment? In the earlier flare timing study, Mulder et al.
(2000) found that non-pilot participants changed from using a critical runway width angle
strategy to using the critical TTC strategy when additional texture was added to their
landing displays. They concluded that their non-pilots became more likely to adopt the
critical TTC strategy as optic tau information became more reliable. Analysis of the
landing displays used in the current experiment suggests that pilots (and possibly nonpilots to a lesser extent) might have been more likely to adopt the critical perceived
height strategy because the optical splay angles formed by the left and right sides of the
runway provided a reliable cue to height AGL for all of the conditions tested (Flach,
Hagen, & Larish, 1992; Flach, Warren, Garness, Kelly, & Stanard, 1997). Optical splay
angle (S) can be defined as follows:
S = tan-1 (Y g /Z)

[2]

Where Y g is the lateral displacement of the left or right edge from the runway centreline and Z is the height AGL of the observer. Since we used a 30 m wide by 840 m long
runway for every landing simulation, runway splay angle information was directly related
(in a non-linear fashion) to height AGL and this information was available during both
day and night lighting conditions (in the case of the latter via the runway lights).
Importantly, this runway splay angle cue is different to the runway width angle (ψ) cue
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outlined in the introduction. While the former strategy would require participants to flare
at different critical splay angles for each of the two approach angles (75.8° during 3°
approaches and 63.4° during 6° approaches), the latter strategy would require participants
to always flare when the angular width of the runway at the aimpoint reached 23.5°.
Figure 9 shows the splay angle at flare data, which reveals very similar patterns of nonpilot, student pilot and private pilot performance to those in height AGL at flare data.
However, it is important to note that if we had used a variety of runways, each with
different dimensions, this splay angle cue would have become less reliable, which might
have forced participants to search for other flare initiation strategies (e.g., based on either
other depth cues, a perceived critical TTC based on optic tau, a perceived critical angular
width of the runway, or some other property of the dynamic visual display).
The lighting and scene effects observed in the flare timing data suggest that our pilot
participants were actually responding to a perceived critical height AGL, not simply a
perceived critical splay angle. That is, optical splay angle appeared to be one of many
cues that contributed to the overall percept of a critical height AGL. Longuet-Higgins
(1984) has previously noted that the scene layout information provided by visual motion
of the runway lights is inherently ambiguous during an aircraft landing at night. This
optic flow can either be correctly interpreted as indicating an oblique approach towards a
horizontal ground plane, or misperceived as pure descent relative to a nearly vertical
planar surface. Consistent with his analysis, many of our participants spontaneously
reported strong illusions of both runway inclination and scene depth during night lighting
conditions without buildings. So it seems likely that adding 3-D buildings to our night
lighting displays improved flare timing performance because they helped disambiguate
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the optic flow information about self-motion and the orientation of the runway and/or
ground plane. However, it is notable that night lighting displays with 3-D buildings
produced more accurate flare timing performance than day lighting displays (both with
and without 3-D buildings).

It is possible that the higher than expected level of

performance error found during day lighting was due to the false visible horizon formed
in these conditions (located 0.86º below the true horizon at the beginning of the display).
According to this argument, misleading information from the visible horizon biased
participant perceptions of environmental distance and ground plane orientation during
day lighting conditions (even when accurate information was provided by adding 3-D
buildings to the displays); and these misperceptions of the environmental layout led to
flare timing errors (e.g., participants might have flared too early when displayed distances
were perceived to be smaller than were being simulated).
In conclusion, the findings of our flight simulation study demonstrate that perceived
height can play an important role in timing the initiation of the landing flare. In this
experiment, pilot, and to a lesser extent non-pilot, flare timing performance were best
explained by participant perceptions of height AGL. There was no support for the use of
the angular width of the runway at the aimpoint. The findings were also clearly contrary
to proposals that pilot timing and control of the landing flare could be based solely on
direct perceptions of TTC via optic tau (e.g., Jump & Padfield, 2006; Padfield, Lee &
Bradley, 2003). Despite the strong support found in this study for the use of a height
strategy, it is important to note that both the current landing simulations and the
experimental task were highly constrained (in comparison to situations faced during
actual landings). Based on previous findings, it is unlikely that a single cue or strategy
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can account for landing flare performance (DeLucia, Kaiser, Bush, Meyer, & Sweet,
2003; Grosz et al., 1995; Hancock & Manser, 1997; Mulder et al., 2000; Smith et al.,
2001; Tresilian et al., 2004). It seems more likely that this perceived critical height based
strategy dominated over TTC and other strategies in the current experiment, because the
optical splay angle formed by the fixed runway in our displays provided a reliable cue to
height AGL in all conditions tested. Even so, it is worth noting that our pilot participants
were more readily able to identify and adopt this height based strategy than the nonpilots, which suggests that they were likely to employ such a strategy during actual flight.
Thus, with the above qualifications in mind, the current findings provide a validation of
current pilot training in the use of critical height AGL as an important cue for initiating
the landing flare.
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Footnotes
These estimates would actually indicate the time it would take for the driver (as

1

opposed to the front of the car) to reach the truck if the current speed was maintained.
Thus, there is an assumption that the driver is able (e.g., from his/her prior experience
with the vehicle) to adjust these TTC estimates to take into account the size of the car’s
hood (see Tresilian, 1991).

Effects of Scenery 36
Table 1
Five Most Commonly Selected Visual Cues
Catergories of Visual Cues Current Study Benbassat & Abramson (2002)
Horizon & End of Runway

37.5 %

26.0 %

Runway Shape & Markings

22.5 %

18.9 %

Angle with Runway

15 %

4.1 %

Familiar Objects

7.5 %

9.5 %
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance for TTC at Flare
Source and comparison

df

Group (3)

2,21

0.44

1.37

0.36

Glideslope (2)

1,21

0.53

40.47**

1.39

Lighting (2)

1,21

0.20

4.19

0.45

Scene (2)

1,21

0.17

4.79*

0.48

Group x Glideslope

2,21

0.53

4.29*

0.64

Group x Lighting

2,21

0.20

0.39

0.19

Group x Scene

2,21

0.17

0.33

0.18

Glideslope x lighting

1,21

0.05

2.17

0.32

Glideslope x Scene

1,21

0.11

2.11

0.32

Lighting x Scene

1,21

0.04

4.62*

0.47

Group x Glideslope x Lighting

2,21

0.05

0.21

0.14

Group x Glideslope x Scene

2,21

0.11

1.34

0.36

Group x Lighting x Scene

2,21

0.04

1.72

0.41

Scene x Glideslope x Lighting

1,21

0.04

0.04

0.04

Group x Scene x Glideslope x Lighting

2,21

0.04

0.35

0.18

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

MSE

F

Cohen’s ƒ
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Runway Width Angle at Flare
Source and comparison

df

Group (3)

2,21

76.45

0.09

0.09

Glideslope (2)

1,21

37.94

48.04**

1.51

Lighting (2)

1,21

68.06

6.76*

0.57

Scene (2)

1,21

14.72

1.53

0.27

Group x Glideslope

2,21

37.94

5.03*

0.69

Group x Lighting

2,21

68.06

0.64

0.25

Group x Scene

2,21

14.72

0.02

0.03

Glideslope x lighting

1,21

9.86

0.91

0.21

Glideslope x Scene

1,21

19.17

1.74

0.29

Lighting x Scene

1,21

6.40

3.75

0.42

Group x Glideslope x Lighting

2,21

9.86

0.51

0.22

Group x Glideslope x Scene

2,21

19.17

0.63

0.25

Group x Lighting x Scene

2,21

6.40

0.33

0.18

Scene x Glideslope x Lighting

1,21

10.90

0.27

0.11

Group x Scene x Glideslope x Lighting

2,21

10.90

0.50

0.22

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

MSE

F

Cohen’s ƒ
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance for Height AGL at Flare
Source and comparison

df

Group (3)

2,21

2.15

0.74

0.27

Glideslope (2)

1,21

2.83

82.73**

1.99

Lighting (2)

1,21

1.43

3.59

0.41

Scene (2)

1,21

1.01

4.31

0.45

Group x Glideslope

2,21

2.83

4.80*

0.68

Group x Lighting

2,21

1.43

0.5

0.22

Group x Scene

2,21

1.01

0.09

0.10

Glideslope x lighting

1,21

0.42

0.04

0.04

Glideslope x Scene

1,21

0.58

0.42

0.14

Lighting x Scene

1,21

0.32

4.80*

0.48

Group x Glideslope x Lighting

2,21

0.42

0.63

0.25

Group x Glideslope x Scene

2,21

0.58

1.28

0.35

Group Lighting x Scene

2,21

0.32

1.48

0.37

Scene x Glideslope x Lighting

1,21

0.31

0.25

0.11

Group Scene x Glideslope x Lighting

2,21

0.31

0.09

0.22

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

MSE

F

Cohen’s ƒ

Effects of Scenery 40
Figure Captions
Figure 1. This figure provides a graphical representation of: (i) the (explicit) aimpoint
(A) which was identified by a rectangular marker in all visual displays; (ii) the (implicit)
aiming line that lies at right angles to the runway and passes through the aimpoint. This
figure also illustrates the several features which might be important for timing the flare.
First, the separation LR forms the angle ψ at the observer’s eye (i.e., the angular width of
the runway along the aiming line). Second, the angular separations LA and RA both
form the angle θ at the observer’s eye. This figure also illustrates how the lexical
feedback on the accuracy of flare timing was provided in the current study.

Figure 2. Figure 2A shows the isotropic pattern of optical expansion produced during
perpendicular approach along a straight line towards a frontoparallel surface. This is
represented as a purely vertical approach – with the camera pointed straight down towards the rectangular runway lying on the horizontal ground plane and surrounded by
3-D buildings. Conversely, Figure 2B shows the asymmetric pattern of optic expansion
produced by a 6° slanted landing approach in the same environment. Each figure was
created by taking two pictures at different stages of the descent and then superimposing
them. An explicit aimpoint marker is visible in each figure, located at the centre of the
runway. White arrows indicate the change in position of selected runway lights from one
snapshot to the next. In Figure 2A, the rate of optical expansion is the same for lights
which lie above and below the aimpoint. In Figure 2B, the rate of optical expansion is
clearly greater for nearer lights which lie below the aimpoint than for farther lights which
lie above this point.
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Figure 3. Examples of the day lighting stimuli (no buildings and buildings) used in this
experiment. The size of explicit aimpoint has been increased to aid in the viewing of
these images.

Figure 4. Cues employed during the landing flare as rated by private and student pilots.

Figure 5. Effects of group type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) and glideslope
(3° or 6°) on flare timing error (s). A negative flare timing error means that the
participant responded before the actual time-to-contact (TTC) reached 2 s. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean.

Figure 6. Effects of scene type (no buildings or buildings) and lighting type (day or
night) on flare timing error (s). A negative flare timing error means that the participant
responded before the actual TTC reached 2 s. Error bars represent the standard error of
the mean.

Figure 7. Effects of group type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) and glideslope
(3° or 6°) on the visual runway width angle (Ψ) at flare initiation. The appropriate
runway width angle for a critical 2 s TTC was 23.5°. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean.
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Figure 8. Effects of group type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) and glideslope
(3° or 6°) on the height above ground level (AGL) at flare initiation. The two critical
heights for a 2 s TTC were 3.8 m for a 3° approach and 7.5 m for a 6° approach. Error
bars represent the standard error of the mean.

Figure 9. Effects of glideslope (3° or 6°) on the runway splay angle at flare initiation. The
two critical splay angles for a 2 s TTC were 75.8° for a 3° approach and 63.4° for a 6°
approach. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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